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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Occupational Safety and Health Act
Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute, 100 S.Ct. 2844
HE SETTING of safety and health standards to govern the nation's work-
places has long been a battleground for American labor and industry.
In the balance of this battle lies not only the health of the American worker,
but to a large extent, the productive capability of this nation's economy.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration [hereinafter cited
as OSHA] was created pursuant to Title 29 of the United States Code,' to
define the terms of this battle. In Industrial Union v. American Petroleum
Institute,' the federal judiciary has taken a hand at making these terms
somewhat more clear. It is the object of this casenote to analyze the impact
of the Industrial Union decision on the regulatory processes of OSHA, a
task which involves a synthesis of the plurality, concurring and dissenting
opinions.'
Industrial Union began its judicial history as a suit for pre-enforce-
ment review, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(f),5 of an OSHA standard for
concentrations of the chemical benzene in workplaces. The standard in
question was promulgated by OSHA under 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5)6 as a
standard to control usage of a toxic, carcinogenic chemical.
I Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976 & Supp. I
1979).
2 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
8 Justices Stevens, Powell, Stewart and Chief Justice Burger held that the standard in question
was invalid for statutory reasons. Justice Rehnquist concurred that the standard was invalid,
but would invalidate a portion of the statute for constitutional reasons. Among the concur-
ring plurality there was wide divergence concerning interpretation of pertinent portions -of
the statutory scheme at issue. In many ways, some of those concurring were more in agree-
ment with the dissent than with each other. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
4 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978) (standard held invalid).
5 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) enables any person adversely affected by a standard to file a petition
challenging its validity with the United States Court of Appeals.
Old. § 655(b)(5) states:
The Secretary [of Labor], in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or
harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that
no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if
such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the
period of his working life. Development of standards under this subsection shall be
based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may
be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety
protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest available scientific
data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and
other health and safety laws. Whenever practicable, the standard promulgated shall be
expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired,
[1751 1
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Benzene is an organic compound which is widely used in the petro-
chemical, rubber and other manufacturing and service industries.7 Science
has known benzene to be a toxin for over seventy years.8 Studies linking
benzene to leukemia and other forms of cancer are to be found in scientific
and medical literature as early as 1928.1
In the first half of this century, considerable research was undertaken
concerning the possible health hazards of benzene." By the mid-1970's, it
was firmly accepted that contact with benzene may produce a significant
increase in the risk of contracting leukemia."
During the 1970's, concern over the carcinogenic qualities of benzene
increased among OSHA officials."2 In 1976, OSHA's research arm, the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health [hereinafter cited
as NIOSH], requested that OSHA set standards for exposure to benzene
at the lowest level possible.'3 Subsequent to further study by NIOSH, 4
the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5), set permanent
standards"5 regulating allowable airborne and dermal contact concentrations
of benzene pursuant to the powers and duties imposed upon the Department
and OSHA by 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). Stated briefly, the standard imposed a
limit on airborne concentrations of one part benzene per one million parts of
air (1 ppm), a maximum dermal contact limit on solutions containing 0.5%
benzene, and a complex system of medical testing and monitoring of all
workplace facilities with airborne benzene concentrations of 0.5 ppm or
greater.
Section 652(8) defines the term "occupational safety and health
standard" as "a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use
of one or more practices, means, methods, operations or processes, rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment."'" Concommitant with section 652(8) is section
655 (b) (5) which requires that the Secretary of Labor set standards "which
most adequately [assure] to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
fSee 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978).
aid.
* 100 S. Ct. at 2852.
10 Id.
It Id. at 2853.
s lid. at 2852-53.
Is Id. at 2853.
1,1d. See also P. INFANTE, R. RINSKY AND J. WAGONER, LEUKEmA AMONG WoRKERs Ex-
POSED TO BENZENE (April 3, 1977) (Industry-wide Studies Branch; Division of Surveillance,
Hazard Evaluations and Field Studies; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202).
Us29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1980).
,29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976),
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available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health or functional capacity" due to exposure to toxic materials.
1
'
In order to fully appreciate the Court's analysis in Industrial Union,
the statutory mechanism for judicial review must be understood. Section
655(f) 8 allows "any person who may be adversely affected by a standard
issued" under section 655(b)(5) to challenge the validity of the standard
in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he resides.
This process is termed pre-enforcement review of the standard.
Section 655(f) delimits the extent of the judicial review by stating
that "determinations of the Secretary [of Labor] shall be conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence."'" In other words, the court of appeals is
not permitted to undertake a trial de novo on the issues presented.2" A re-
viewing court must uphold a standard set by the Secretary of Labor if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
21
In deciding Industrial Union, the Court saw considerable interplay
between the various sections of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.2
As previously stated, section 655(b) (5) empowers the Secretary of Labor
to set standards governing the use of toxic materials. In defending the
benzene standards, the Secretary maintained that section 655(b)(5) re-
quires that standards be set for toxic materials which in all cases assure
a workplace that either gives an absolute assurance of safety for every
worker or that reduces exposures to the lowest level feasible, i.e., a level
technologically achievable at a cost that would not impair the viability of
the regulated industry.23 However, the plurality in Industrial Union held that
before any standard could be set under section 655 (b) (5), or any other
section of the act, a threshold test must be met.2' The plurality developed
this threshold test from its reading of the definition of the term "standard"
in section 652(8).




2oSee American Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 831 (3d Cir. 1978) where
the decision of the Secretary of Labor to establish a standard prescribing particular controls
and procedures to reduce coke oven employee's exposure in specified regulated areas to
toxic emissions in concentrations no greater than 0.15 mg of benzene-soluable fraction of
total particulate matter per cubic meter of air present during production of coke over an
eight-hour period was a legislative decision reasonably drawn from the record and thus
had to be upheld.
21 Id.
22 100 S. Ct. at 2862.
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by the plurality is, however, more complex than simply relating an enabling
section back to its definitional section. However, it also involves the inter-
play of the possibility of judicial review under section 655(f) and the
substantive scope of that review.2"
Section 655(f) requires a reviewing court to accept determinations of
the Secretary of Labor, and thereby OSHA, if those determinations are sup-
ported by substantial evidence. In setting the threshold test for OSHA
standards, the Court interpreted section 655(f) as requiring review via
a substantial evidence test, much the same as the substantial evidence test
applicable under the Administrative Procedures Act," and other federal
regulatory statutes.
The substantial evidence test used by the Court finds its basis in
decisions concerning several federal rulemaking agencies. In Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB,7 a ruling made by the National Relations Board was
challenged. Prior to this decision, there had been conflicting holdings as
to the latitude allowed a reviewing court when the enabling statute stipu-
lated that the findings of the administrative agency should be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence. 8 It had been held that the reviewing
court must uphold the agency's determination if the evidence supporting that
determination was sufficient to justify a refusal to direct a verdict against
the decision of the agency if the trial were to a jury.2 9
Overturning its previous precedents, the Supreme Court in Universal
Camera" set a new standard for review by using the substantial evidence
test. The standard of review set in Universal Camera allowed the reviewing
court to look not only at evidence which would tend to support the agency's
determination, as had previously been the rule, but also to all other evidence
25 Id. at 2869.26See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976).
27 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
2 8 Id. at 476.2 9 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939). Cf. Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (evidence is sufficient to sustain
the findings of the Board if it is substantial, i.e., "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion").
20 One basis for the decision in Universal Camera was a change in the wording of § 160(e)
from "mhe finding of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive"
to "mhe findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)(1976) (originally enacted as the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 10(f), 49 Stat.449 (1935)), as amended, Labor Management Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 10(f), 61 Stat. 136(1947). However, since the language of 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) ('The determinations of theSecretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered
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in the record, and then to overturn the determination of the administrative
regulatory agency when such determination was made "against the manifest
weight of the evidence."'"
The fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court of original jurisdiction for
Industrial Union,3' 2 adopted the definition of the substantial evidence test
found in the often cited case Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Products
Safety Commission." Since the Fifth Circuit's view of the substantial evi-
dence test in American Petroleum was essentially upheld by the Supreme
Court in Industrial Union, it is of some interest here.
The subject of review in Aqua Slide was a standard set by the Con-
sumer Products Safety Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (c)1 4 includes a meth-
od of review of consumer products safety standards in a federal court of
appeals similar to the procedure in 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) for the review of
occupational safety and health standards. According to section 2058(c),
standards set by the Consumer Products Safety Commission will be upheld
if "supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole."
'
As in Universal Camera, the Aqua Slide decision on whether the Com-
mission had met the substantial evidence test was based upon evidence in
the record both supporting and in opposition to the Commissioner's find-
ings."8 The court in Aqua Slide did, however, set some new precedent im-
portant to the decision in Industrial Union by applying a substantial evidence
test to the requirement in 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a)(1) that standards set by
the Commission be "reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce an un-
reasonable risk of injury . ,,. "' The court's application of the substantial
evidence test in interpreting the phrase "reasonably necessary" in section
2056(a) carried over into its analysis in American Petroleum" and to the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Industrial Union.
Throughout the opinion in Industrial Union," the Supreme Court re-
ferred to the definitional language in 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) as requiring stand-
ards set by OSHA to be "reasonably necessary and appropriate."' In fact, the
Court's reasoning indicated that this language was the correct reading of the
31 340 U.S. at 484-85.
32 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
s3 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978).
s"Consumer Product Safety Act 11, 15 U.S.C. §, 2058(c) (1976).
$5569 F.2d at 835.
36 Id. at 844.
37 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a)(1) (1976).
38 581 F.2d at 505. See Case Note, 10 ENVT'L L. 664. (1980).
39 100 S. Ct. at 2862, 2863, 2872, 2874.
40 1d. (emphasis added).
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statute. However, 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) states: "The term 'occupational safe-
ty and health standard' means a standard which requires conditions, or the
adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment and places of employment."'" The Court's reading of this
section has considerable impact upon the threshold test applied to the
OSHA benzene standard.
Notwithstanding this unusual reading of section 652(8), the Court
proceeds on the assumption that any OSHA standard must be based upon
a finding that the standard is reasonably necessary due to the existence of
a significant health or safety risk in workplaces. 2 Furthermore, the fact
that the standard is reasonably necessary must be supported by substantial
evidence.,3 This brings the Court squarely to the threshold test.
Logically, in order to show that a standard is reasonably necessary
due to the existence of a significant risk of material health impairment in
workplaces, it must first be shown that a significant risk of material health
impairment in workplaces exists. This threshold finding that such a risk
exists must be supported by substantial evidence in order to withstand
the scrutiny of a reviewing court."
As previously stated, benzene is a carcinogenic substance. It is OSHA
policy that standards for carcinogens be set at the lowest feasible level
unless it can be shown that some higher level is safe. 5 OSHA interprets
the term "lowest feasible" to mean that level which is the lowest techno-
logically possible without causing the complete financial ruin of the in-
dustries concerned."'
By setting the allowable standard for carcinogenic substances at the
lowest feasible level, OSHA has in essence shifted the burden of proving
what level of a substance is safe to groups advocating a higher level. The
Court felt that this reallocation of the burden could not be allowed.,7
Upon finding that a substance was a potential carcinogen, if OSHA
could simply shift the burden of showing what level of exposure to the
substance constitutes a significant risk of material health impairment, it
41 29 U.S.C. § 652 (1976) (emphasis added).
42 100 S. Ct. at 2863.
43ld. at 2871.
"Id. at 2864, 2869.
45ld. at 2847, 2855.
"Id. at 2847. For a discussion of the concept of feasibility in this setting, see Industrial
Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
41 100 S. Ct. at 2869.
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could also bypass the threshold test of showing that a significant risk of
material health impairment existed. Apparently, this is what the plurality
believed OSHA did in promulgating the benzene standard in question. "8
In their view, OSHA declared that benzene was a carcinogen and then
proceeded to set a maximum exposure level standard at the lowest feasible
level. In using this approach OSHA failed to prove, by substantial evidence,
that exposure to benzene at any level above the lowest feasible level con-
stituted a significant risk of material health impairment; thus, OSHA
failed to meet the threshold test applied by the Court.""
The plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions discuss at length
the degree of certainty required in OSHA's initial finding that a significant
risk of material health impairment exists." Interestingly, the opinions of
eight of the nine justices were in substantial agreement on this issue."'
The pertinent language in 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b)(5) states that stand-
ards dealing with toxic materials shall be set "on the basis of the best
available evidence.""' With respect to meeting the threshold test of showing
that a significant risk of material harm exists, the plurality opinion held that
"OSHA is not required to support its finding that a significant risk exists
with anything approaching scientific certainty." '"
This evidentiary standard recognizes that many times current under-
standing of the substances OSHA is required to regulate lies "on the frontiers
of scientific knowledge."5' However, in this case, to a large extent due to
the application of OSHA's policy concerning carcinogens, OSHA made
little if any attempt to meet even this slight evidentiary burden.5
The holding that the evidence required to meet the threshold burden
need not provide proof by "anything approaching scientific certainty"'' was
supported in two of the concurring opinions and also in the dissent.57 How-
ever, the opinions of five of the justices, comprised of Justice Powell and
See Id. at 2870.
9 d. at 2873.
50 Id. at 2871, 2876 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment), 2888 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
51The remaining justice, Justice Rehnquist, did not reach this issue in his opinion. d. at
2878-2887 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
5229 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
53 100 S. Ct. at 2871.
5' Id.
55 Id. at 2870.
"Id. at 2871.
57 Chief Justice Burger supported this holding in general terms only. Id. at 2874-75 (Burger,
J., concurring). Justice Powell stated his approval of this holding. Id. at 2876 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgement). See also Id. at 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the four dissenting justices, go beyond the plurality's holding in dealing
with situations where even the best currently available scientific techniques
cannot aid OSHA in meeting the plurality's threshold test.5" In such cases,
where the long term risk of exposure to a toxic substance cannot be quantified
even if the most advanced scientific techniques are used, what is required of
OSHA?
The four dissenting justices and Justice Powell opine that such a situ-
ation would not prevent OSHA from taking valid regulatory action.59
They agree that OSHA could meet its threshold requirement by a showing
of substantial evidence that a risk does exist and that current scientific
techniques do not permit measurement of the magnitude of this risk."0
In the final analysis, exactly where do the opinions in Industrial Union
leave OSHA in its attempt to promulgate valid standards to govern the
usage of toxic substances in American workplaces? And where does this
leave the American worker with respect to his right under law to be pro-
tected from a work environment which could lead to his disability or death
in the future? While in no sense providing a clear, definitive answer to
these questions, a blending of the plurality, concurring and dissenting
opinions in Industrial Union does reveal at least some guidance.
In formulating standards for toxic materials OSHA must first, show,
by substantial evidence, that a significant risk of material harm exists due
to the current usage of the toxic substance to be regulated. In meeting
this threshold test, OSHA may use any and all available scientific techniques
in showing both the existence and the magnitude of the risk, even if the
techniques are somewhat speculative in nature. Should the current level
of scientific technique and knowledge make it impossible for OSHA to
quantify the exact nature of the risk present, OSHA must, by substantial
evidence, prove its inability to show such quantification. As for the American
worker, he must rely upon federal administrative agencies and judicial
tribunals to ensure that safety which American unions are unable and
American industry unwilling to provide.
PATRICK M. VITONF
I8 d. at 2876 (Powell, J., concurring in.part and in judgment), 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 2876 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in judgment), 2904 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
So ld.
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